Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP78B05167A000800030003-1

STAT

With one wind will?"

STAT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03 : CIA-RDP78B05167A000800030003-1

NPIC ROUTING SLIP

FROM: CSD				DATE: D JUNE REMARKS
	то	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS
DIR				
DEP/DIR				
EXEC/DIR	X			
ASST FOR ADMIN				
ASST FOR OPS				
ASST FOR PA				
ASST FOR P&D				
CH/CSD				
CH/PD				
CH/PSD				
CH/TID				
		-		
CH/CIA/PID				
CH/DIA/NPIC				
CH/SPAD				
LO/NSA				1



HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROLS ONLY





WARNING

"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law".

It is to be seen only by U. S. PERSONNEL especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive TALENT-KEYHOLE information: Its security must be maintained in accordance with KEYHOLE and TALENT regulations.

TOP SECRET

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP78B05167A000800030003-1

TOP SECRET CHESS RUFF

TCS 2433-64/KH 9 June 1964

Copy _/

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Director, NPIC

SUBJECT

(1) Preliminary Evaluation of PAG


(2) Operations General

I. PAG


- A. Effectiveness: PAG's effectiveness must be gauged by the time-liness and accuracy of their response to national requirements. The "can-do" approach has prevailed and substantial improvements have been noted during the past year. At present no sizeable backlog exists on the first and second phase readouts of system missions. Although production of detailed reports has increased, a bottleneck in the production of these reports does exist outside PAG. Much too often a "pre-release" report has been given to the requester in order to meet a deadline. Experiments with codified and machine reporting systems have been tried with gratifying results. The Director and senior Staff personnel have been kept informed on significant intelligence items.
- B. Personnel: The leadership of PAG has been positive and dynamic. The present Assistant for Photographic Analysis is to be commended for his ability in directing PAG, as well as serving three masters. In performing his complex liaison duties, he has not compromised any individuals and has earned the confidence of the entire organization. The selection of the Deputy, IPO, division chiefs and their deputies has been exceptionally strong in terms of fulfilling their job requirements. Personnel selection at lower levels and the rotation policy have created problems. Some dislike of the "military approach" has caused a few morale problems.
- C. Production: Conflict concerning the definition of national and departmental projects, as well as assignment of priorities, has hampered PAG. Assignment of priorities should be the function of the Executive Director. Within the limits of the assigned priorities, flexibility for the implementation of these priorities should be left up to the responsible division.

Selection of capable and experienced coordinators for first and second phase readouts is mandatory and in most instances this has been done successfully. However, the selection of team personnel for some projects has occasionally left much to be desired.





Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP78B05167A000800030003-1



TCS 2433-64/KH Page 2

SUBJECT:

(1) Preliminary Evaluation of PAG

(2) Operations General

Lack of firm guidelines within the Center has created problems concerning what items should be read out and the methodology to be followed for reading out missions. This has sometimes resulted in the loss of good intelligence.

The requirement procedure, which the departmental unit or requester uses, often determines whether or not the requirement will be handled as a national or departmental project. This has created a lopsided situation in the Center. PID consistently has an overload of work on detailed or specific requests while PAG, after completing first and second phase projects, could assume additional requirements. A more effective secretariattype group, which would assign all projects other than covert to the division that can most readily handle them, would improve this situation.

ICP SZOTAT CHIES RUFF

TCS 2433-64/KH Page 3

II. General Operations

A. Operations Staff: The position of Assistant for Operations is one of the most important in the structure of NPIC. The present incumbent is one of the hardest working and most loyal individuals in the Center. The missions and functions for which he and his staff are responsible encompass a very broad and critical spectrum. It is obvious that dynamic and experienced personnel are needed on this staff so that certain responsibilities can be delegated among the personnel so as not to hamstring the operations of NPIC nor to overburden the Assistant with many minor but necessary details.

In the line of constructive criticism of the present situation, it is possible that: (a) the present staff personnel are not strong in terms of their job requirements or (b) authority and responsibilities are not delegated to subordinates by the Assistant, possibly because of the personnel problem.

B. Requirements Policy: The Center lacks an efficient requirements policy. Requirements for photographic intelligence are handled by the Director's office, the Operations Staff, PAG, PTD and DIA. It appears that no one unit within NPIC is cognizant of the overall Center effort.

Many requirements are not handled with a high degree of professionalism. Little initial analysis is made when requirements are submitted to determine if they could be answered by already existing reports. Attempts by CSD to bring this problem to the surface have been unsuccessful. Duplication of effort in the KH field is excessive.


- C. Program Analysis: The Program Analysis System has been active for almost six months and it appears that little has been done to analyze the statistics regarding overall planning and management. Preliminary studies regarding the costs of such projects as the VISS, TAS, Cuba readouts, etc., should be made in order to provide policy and operational guidance, both for present and future needs for equipment and personnel.
- D. Existing Problems: There is and has been need for guidance and direction concerning division functions and their interrelationship when new areas of effort are encountered. The Photo Mosaic Program is an example. No forum other than the Friday staff meetings now exists to discuss this problem.

Relationships of the Center and its components with other domestic and foreign intelligence groups have not always been effectively coordinated or exploited. Many intelligence units have sent representatives to visit the Center, but little initiative has been displayed by the Center in returning these visits, in answering the requests for advice and guidance, or in responding to offers to utilize and/or exploit their facilities.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03 : CIA-RDP78B05167A000800030003-1

and the same bearing bear

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP78B05167A000800030003-1



TCS 2433-64/KH Page 4

The Center is the acknowledged leader in the exploitation of photographic intelligence. Yet, with the exception of equipment procurement meetings, little has been done to host meetings for the discussions and exchange of new ideas and techniques.

A stronger approach to solving these problems can not only benefit the Center but also benefit the entire intelligence community.

DINO A. BRUGIONI Chief, Collateral Support Division, NPIC

Distribution:

Cy 1 & 2 - Executive Director/NFIC

3 & 4 - CSD/NPIC

50X1